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[So F. No. 19342.

In Bank.

Mar. 22, 1957.]

CLAUDINE HERDA, Appellant, V. CLAH,ENCE HERDA,
Respondent.
[1] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-E1Iect of Agreement of Parties.
-Husband and wife made provisions for support and maintenance an mtegral part of their property settlement agreement where they clearly expressed their purpose to settle
their rights in all respects except as otherwise provided, where
the wife accepted the provisions for her in full satisfaction
of her right to the community property and of her right to
support and maintenance of herself and the minor children,
and where the husband agreed to pay her a designated sum
per month for such support and maintenance, and the fact
that the amount of existing community property was small
and the amount that might otherwise accrue before termination of the marriage was speculative did not detract from the
spouses' clearly expressed intention, as between themselves, to
fix the amount of subsequent payments.
[2] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.It is not significant that the amount agreed on for support
and maintenance of the wife and minor children in a property
settlement agreement was the same that the husband had been
paying the wife following their separation but before the
agreement was executed j the parties were entitled to agree
to an amount that could not be decreased during the minority
of the children or increased unless the welfare of the children
so required.
[3] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Duration of Allowance-Tel'Dlination.-Where there was no express provision in a property
[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 217; Am.3m..
Divorce and Separation. § 586 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Divorce, § 203; [3, 4] Divorce,
§ 214; [5] Divorce, § 216(5); [6] Divorce, § 180 (4).
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settlement agreement incorporated in a 1938 divorce decree that
the payments attributable to the wife's support should terminate on her remarriage and no express provision that they
should continue until her death, the insignificant amount of the
eommunity property involved justified the conclusion that by
necessary implication the payments attributable to the wife's
support should terminate on her remarriage just as those' attributable to the support of the children terminate on their
reaching their majority.
[4] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Duration of Allowance-Termina.tion.-The conclusion that payments provided for the support
and maintenance of the wife in a property settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce decree should terminate on the
wife's remarriage, based either on an express provision to that
effect or inferred from the provisions of the agreement as a
whole, does not conflict with the conclusion that it is an integrated bargain and that the payments are not otherwise subject to modification; it would be unreasonable to conclude·
that the payment should continue for the wife's benefit after
the obligation to support the children had terminated on their
reaching their majority and the obligation of her support had
been assumed by her second husband.
[6] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Modi1ication of Allowance-Rearing
a.nd Determination of Motion.-An order denying a motion to
have payments for the support and maintenance of a former
wife and minor children reduced on the grounds that the wife
had remarried and that one of the children was about to enter
the armed services was not res judieata in a subsequent proceeding to have the payments terminated on the ground that
the wife had remarried and both children had reaehed their
majority where, at the time of the previous modification proceedings, neither child had reached his majorit:1' and it could
not be determined whether denial of the motion was based
on a determination that the wife's remarriage was immaterial
or on continuing need of the full amount for the children's
support, care and education.
[6] ld.-Counsel Fees.-Where a property settlement agreement
incorporated in a divorce decree specifically provided that the
husband should indemnify the wife for all costs and attorney's
fees in defending any motion or proceeding affecting the agreement, and did not make her right to such fees dependent on
her inability to pay them, the trial court erred in Mnying her
prayer therefor on the ground that she had not shown such
inability.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San
Mateo County teJ;Biinating
support payments under a 'divorce
"...

)
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judgment. Murray Draper, Judge. Order affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
Henry W. Schaldach for Appellant.
Chas. E. R. Fulcher for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff and defendant were married in
1925 and separated in 1937. On March 1, 1938, they executed
a property settlement agreement. It recited that owing to
disputes and differences between them the parties had agreed
to live separate and apart and that it was their "mutual wish
and desire . . . that a full and final adjustment of all their
property rights, interests and claims be had, settled and determined by said parties in this Agreement, including custody
and maintenance of the rtwo] minor children of said lJarties."
It provided:
.
"Now THEREFORE, it is agreed in consideration of the
mutual promises, agreements, and covenants contained herein,
it is covenanted, agreed, and promised by each party hereto,
to and with the other party hereto, as follows:
"FIRST: That, except as hereinafter specified, each party
hereto is hereby released and absolved from any and all obligations and liabilities for the future acts and. duties of the
other, and that each of said parties hereby releases the other
from any and all liabilities, debts or obligations of any kind
or character incurred by the other from and after this date,
and from any and all claims and demands, including all claims
of either party upon the other for support and maintenance
as wife or husband or otherwise, it being understood that
this instrument is intended to settle the rights of the parties
hereto in all respects, except as hereinafter provided. • • .
"FIFTH: [Plaintiff] does and shall accept the provisions
herein made for her in full satisfaction of her right to the
community property of the respective parties hereto, and in
full satisfaction of her right to support and maintenance, and
for the support and maintenance of said minor children as
herein provided."
Provisions were then made for the division of the property.
Plaintiff received household personal property and defendant
received an automobile. A life insurance policy on defendant's life was assigned to plaintiff and defendant agreed to
keep the policy in fQrce. It was further agreed that plaintiff
should have custody of the minor children and be entitled
to take them out of the state.
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Paragraph eight provided that "The husband agrees in
consideration of the premises and mutual covenants and agreements herein contained to pay to the wife the sum of Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) per month as and for the
support and maintenance of herself and the minor children
of said parties, said payments to commence on March 1, 1938
and to continue monthly thereafter on the first (1st) day of
each and every month thereafter." It also provided that
defendant should pay certain debts and plaintiff's moving
expenses should she decide to leave the state.
On March 18, 1938, plaintiff filed an action for divorce on
the grounds of extreme cruelty. She attached a copy of
the agreement to the complaint and prayed that it be approved and made a part. of the decree by reference. On
April 18th she secured an interlocutory decree of divorce,
which approved the agreement and incorporated it in its
entirety by reference. It also provided that "IT Is FURTHER
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant be, and he
hereby is, required to pay to plaintiff herein, as and for her
support and the support, care and education of the minor
children of said parties, the sum of Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($250.00) per month, which said payments to commence March 1, 1938, and continue monthly· hereafter on
the 1st day of each and every month."
A final decree of divorce was entered in 1939, and plaintiff
remarried in 1943. In 1944 defendant moved to have the
payments reduced on the grounds that plaintiff had remarried
and that one of the children was about to enter the armed
services, but his motion was denied. In 1954 he moved to
have the payments terminated on the ground that plaintiff
had remarried and both the children had reached their majority. Plaintiff moved for attorney's fees to resist defendant's motion, and following a hearing the court ordered that
the interlocutory and final decrees "be modified by terminating all payments for the support of the plaintiff and for
the support, care and education of the minor children of the
parties hereto forthwith." It also ordered that no counsel
fees be allowed for plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff appeals.
She contends that the provision for monthly payments was
an integral and inseparable part of the property settlement
agreement of the parties and that therefore the amount of
the payments attl'ibutable to her cannot be reduced because
of her remarriage. She also contends that the order denying
modification in 1944 is res judicata in her favor. Defendant
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contends, however, that the provision for monthly payments
was a provision for alimony subject to section 139 of the Civil
Code and that even if it constitutes an integral and inseparable part of the property settlement agreement, his obligations thereunder terminated after plaintiff remarried and the
children reached their majority. He also ·contends that the
1944 order is not res judicata on the ground that it may
have been based on continuing need of the full amount for the
support, care, and education of the children, who were then
still minors.
In Messenger v. Messenger; 46 Ca1.2d 619, 628 [297 P.2d
988], we held that when "the parties have clearly expressed
their 'purpose of fixing and adjusting their personal and
property rights, ' have provided that the provision for alimony
is 'for and in consideration of the permanent and lasting
division and settlement of all their property rights of every
kind and nature,' and the wife has waived 'all right to future
maintenance and support . . . I except as herein otherwise
expressly provided,' the conclusion is inescapable that they
have made the provisions for support and maintenance an
integral and inseparable part of their property settlement
agreement. With such conclusive evidence of integration, the
provisions for support and maintenance or alimony would be
subject to modification only if the parties expressly so provided." (Accord: Anderson Y. Mart, 47 Ca1.2d 274, 279
[303 P.2d 539].) [1] It is clear from the provisions of the
agreement quoted above, that the agreement in the present
case falls squarely within the foregoing rule. The parties
stated their intention to settle both their property and support and maintenance rights, and the fact that the amount of
existing community property was small and the amount that
might otherwise accrue before the termination of the marriage
was speculative, in no way detracts from their clearly expressed intention, as between themselves, to fix and determine
the amount of the payments thereafter. [~] Similarly, it
is not significant that the amount agreed upon was the same
amount defendant had been paying plaintiff following their
separation but before the agreement was executed. In the
absence of the agreement, that amount might or might not
have been accepted by the court as appropriate for alimony
and child support and it could have been modified in the
event of changed circumstances. The parties were entitled to
agree to an amount that could not be decreased during the
minority of the chjldren
or increased unless the welfare of
,
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the children so required. (See Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2rl
36,43 [265 P.2d 873) ; Messenger v. Messenger, supra, 46 Cal.
2d 619, 627-628; Anderson v. Mart, supra, 47 Ca1.2d 274,
281.)
[3] The question remains whether the agreement may
properly be interpreted as providing for payments for plaintiff's support following her remarriage. In Anderson v. Mart,
supra, 47 Ca1.2d 274, 280, we pointed out that in the case
of integrated agreements executed and incorporated in decrees
entered before the 1951 amendment to section 139, payments
pursuant thereto do "not terminate on the death of the
husband or the remarriage of the wife unless the agreement
so provided. [Citations.)" (See also Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 125 Cal.App.2d 419, 427 [270 P.2d 1036].) In the
present case there is no express provision that the payments
attrihutable to plaintiff's support should terminate on her
remarriage. There is also, however, no express provision that
they should continue until her death. Under these circumstances we have concluded that the insignificant .amount of
the community property involved in the agreement justifies
the conclusion that by necessary implication the payments
attributable to plaintiff's support should terminate on her
remarriage just as the payments attributable to the support
of the children terminate on their reaching their majority.
In Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36, 41-42 [265 ·P.2d 873],
the court stated that when "the parties have made the provision for support and maintenance an integral part of their
property settlement agreement, the monthly payments will
ordinarily have a dual character. To the extent that they
are designed to discharge the obligation of support and maintenance they will ordinarily reflect the characteristics of that
obligation and thus have the indicia of alimony. [Citations.)
On the other hand, to the extent that they represent a
division of the community property itself, or constitute an
inseparable part of the consideration for the property settlement, they are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modified without changing the terms of the property settlement
agreement of the parties." It was therefore held in the Dexter
case that a provision that the payments should terminate on
the remarriage of the wife did not indicate that the monthly
payments provided in an integrated agreement were for alimony. [4] It is thus clear that the conclusion t.!lat the
payments should so terminate, based either on an express
provision to that ~ect or inferred from the provisioIUI of
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the agreement as a wholc, does not conflict with the conclusion
that it is an integrated bargain and that the payments are
not otherwise subject to modification. Since the agreement in the present case dealt primarily with support rights
and the payments were described as for support and maintenance, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the agreement contemplated that the payments should continue for
plaintiff's benefit after the obligation to support the children
had terminated (see Anderson v. Mart, supra, 47 Ca1.2d
274, 283, and cases cited) and the obligation of plaintiff's
support had been assumed by her second husband. Harnden v.
Harnden, 102 Ca1.App.2d 209 [227 P.2d 51], Lane v. Bradley,
124 Ca1.App.2d 661 [268 P.2d 1092], and Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 125 Ca1.App.2d 419 [270 P .2d 1036], are not contrary
to our conclusion herein since in those cases the agreements
either expressly provided when the payments'should terminate
or involved the settlement of substantial property rights.
(5] At the time of the previous modification proceedings
neither child had reached his majority and it cannot be determined from the record whether the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to reduce the payments was based on a
determination that plaintiff's remarriage was immaterial or
was based on continuing need of the full amount for the
support, care, and education of the children. Since the children have now reached their majority, the circumstances have
materially changed since the entry of that order, and plaintiff has failed to prove that it was based on a determination
of the issue now before us. Accordingly, it is not res judicata.
(Hurd v. Albert, 214 Cal. 15, 26 [3 P.2d 545, 76 A.L.R. 1348] ;
Horton v. Goodenough, 184 Cal. 451, 460 [194 P. 34] ; Emerv. Yosemite Gold Min. etc. Co., 149 Cal. 50, 57 [85 P. 122] ;
Estate of Miller, 104 Cal.App.2d 1, 18 [230 P.2d 667].)
(6] Paragraph ten of the agreement provides in part that
defendant agrees to "pay and indemnify the wife for all
expenses, costs and attorney's fees in defending any suit,
motion or proceeding brought by the husband or anyone in
his behalf in any manner affecting this Agreement, and the
wife's right thereto in any respect whatsoever." Since this
provision does not make plaintiff's right to attorney's fees dependent on her inability to pay them, the trial court erred
in denying her prayer therefor on the ground that she had
not shown such inability.
The order is rev~rsed insofar as it denies plaintUf's motion

.on
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for an award of attorney's fees.
affirmed.

In all other respects it is

Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.

)

CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the
judgment of affirmance. I do not, however, agree with the
majority in its reliance on the cases of Dexter v. Dexter, 42
Ca1.2d 36 [265 P.2d 873], Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Ca1.2d
619 [297 P.2d 988], and Anderson v. Mart, 47 Ca1.2d 274
[303 P.2d 539]. I express no approval of the law as set forth
in the above mentioned cases. In the Dexter and Messenger
cases the court was concerned chiefly with the character of
the payments provided for in the property settlement agreement and whether or not such payments constituted such an
integral part of the agreement as to prevent a subsequent
modification thereof.
Anderson v. Mart, supra, has some analogy to the case at
bar. In that case plaintiff's former husband died. The agreement there contained no provision t.hat the monthly payments
should cease on plaintiff's remary;i,A\ge, or the attainment of
majority by the parties' child, or tile death of the payor. In
the case at bar, the agreement likewise contained no provision
for termination of the monthly payments by remarriage of the
payee, majority of the children, or death of the payor. Both
the Anderson case and the case at bar involved agreements
entered into prior to the 1951 amendment of section 139 of
the Civil Code. The section as it read prior to the amendment provided that "Upon the remarriage of the wife, the
husband shall no longer be obligated to provide for her
support but such remarriage shall not affect his duty to provide for the maintenance of the children of his marriage."
The 1951 amendment provided that "Except as otherwise
agreed by the parties in writing, the obligation of any party
in any decree, judgment or order for the support and maintenance of the other party shall terminate upon the death of
the obligor or npon the remarriage .of·the other party."
The trial court in the Anderson case held that the payor's
estate was indebted to plaintiff (his former wife) on the property settlement agreement and that the "agreement was incorporated in and made a part of the decree in the divorce
action and that the provision for support therein was an
inseparable part of an integrated property settlement agreement and therefore entered judgment for plaintiff for $14,190
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to be paid out of the funds of the estate in due course of
administration. That sum was fixed by the court as the present value of $50 per month for plaintiff's life expectancy."
(47 Ca1.2d 274, 277, 278 [308 P.2d 539].) A majority of
this court held that the trial court properly allowed plaintiff
to recover from her former husband's estate "the amount
attributable to plaintiff's support for the remainder of her
life expectancy." The conclusion was reached by reasoning
that the support payments were not separable from the balance
of the agreement and that the waiver provisions did not prevent plaintiff from enforcing the agreement as made. A majority also held that the agreement in the Anderson ease
fell "squarely within the . . . rule" of the Messenger case.
In the case at bar, where the majority reach an entirely
different result, it is also held that the agreement "in the
present case falls squarely within .the . . . rule" of the
Messenger case. That rule is that when "the parties have
clearly expressed their 'purpose of fixing and adjusting their
personal and property rights,' have provided that the provision for alimony is 'for and in consideration of the permanent and lasting division and settlement of all their property rights of every kind and nature,' and the wife has
waived 'all right to future maintenance and. support . . .,
except as herein otherwise expressly provided,' the conclusion is inescapable that they have made the provisions
for support and maintenance an integral and inseparable
part of their property settlement agreement. With such
conclusive evidence of integration, the provisions for support
and maintenance or alimony would be subject to modification only if the parties expressly so provided." (46 Ca1.2d
619,628 [297 P.2d 988].) Despite the fact that the agreement
here contained no provision of any kind for termination of
the monthly pa~7ments the majority holds that such payments terminated upon the remarriage of the wife and the
attainment of majority by the children. It is noted, inter
alia, in the majority opinion that there was here "no express
provision that they [the payments] should continue until
her [plaintiff's] death." There was also no such provision
in the Anderson case agreement.
The reasoning of the majority in the present case and
the result reached by it appear to me to be inconsistent_ In
the first instance the Messenger rule is relied upon and it
is also said that $·!1'he parties stated their intention to settle
both their property and support and maintenance rights, and
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the fact that the amount of existing community property was
small and the amount that might otherwise accrue before tlle
termination of the marriage was speculative, in no way
detracts from their clearly expressed intention, as between
themselves, to fix and determine the amount of the payments
thereafter. Similarly, it is not significant that the amount
agreed upon was the same amount defendant had been
paying plaintiff following their separation but before the
agreement was executed. In the absence of the agreement,
that amount might or might not have been accepted by the
court as appropriate for alimony and child support and it
could have been modified in the event of changed circumstances. The parties were entitled to agree to an amount
that could not be decreased during the minority of the children or increased unless the welfare of the children so required. " The majority, having concluded that this was an
integrated, inseparable property settlement agreement, then
stated: "The question remains whether'the agreement may
properly be interpreted as providing for payments for plaintiff's support following her remarriage. In Anderson v. Mart,
supra, 47 Ca1.2d 274, 280, we pointed out that in the case
of integrated agreements executed and incorporated in decrees entered before the 1951 amendment to section 139,
payments pursuant thereto do 'not terminate on the death
of the husband or the remarriage of the wife unless the agreement so provided. [Citations.]' (See also Taliaferro v.
Taliaferro, 125 Cal.App.2d 419, 427 [270 P.2d 1036].) In
the present case there is no express provision that the payments attributable to plaintiff's support should terminate on
her remarriage. There is also, however, no express provision that they should continue until her death. Under
these circumstances we have concluded that the insignificant
amount of the community property involved in the agreement
justifies the conclusion that by necessary implication the
payments attributable to plaintiff's support should terminate
on her remarriage just as the payments attributable to the
s1lpport of the children term1'naie on their reaching their majority." (Emphasis added.) On just what reasoning this
conclusion is based escapes me. If the monthly payments are
an integrated part of the property settlement agreement
and the parties ~~eed that the wife would receive $250 per
'month without express provision for the termination thereof
on her remarriage, how can it be concluded that her remarriage terminated such payments in view of the reliance
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by the majority on the Anderson case t The code draws
no distinction between remarriage of the wife and the death
of the payor.
The majority next quotes from the case of Dexter v. Dexter,
42 Ca1.2d 36, 41, 42 [265 P.2d873], to the effect that monthly
payments in a property settlement agreement "will ordi, narily have a dual character. To the extent that they are
designed to discharge the obligation of support and maintenance they will ordinarily reflect the characteristics of that
obligation and thus have the indicia of alimony. [Citations.]
On the other hand, to the extent that they represent a
division of the community property itself, or constitute an
inseparable part of the consideration for the property settlement, they are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modified
without changi~g the terms of the property settlement agreement of the parties.!' The majority then notes: "It was
therefore held in the Dexter case that a provision that the
payments should terminate on the remarriage of the wife did
not indicate that the monthly payments provided in an
integrated agreement were for alimony. It is thus clear thtlt
the conclusion that the payments should so terminate, based
either on an express provision to that effect or inferred from
tle provisions of the agreement as a whole, dfJes not conflict
with the concZusion that if is an integrated bargain and that
the payments are not otherwise subject to modification."
(Emphasis added.) Then we come to the illogical summation that c, Since the agreement in the present case dealt
primarily with support rights and the payments were described as for support and maintenance, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the agreement contemplated that the
payments should continue for plaintiff's benefit after the
obligation to support the children had terminated (see AnderIon v. Mart, supra, 47 Cal.2d 274, 283, and cases cited) and
the obligation of plaintiff's support had been assumed by her
second husband" I I'll the Anderson case the provisions were
also for support and maintenance, and furthermore, a majority of this ,court has heretofore held that the labels adopted
by the parties are not conclusive and that it is not controlling
that the monthly payments for support have some of the
indicia of alimony (Messenger v. Me88enger, 46 Ca1.2d 619,
625, 626 [297 P.2d 988], Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36 [265
P.2d 873], and Fox v. Fox, 42 Ca1.2d 49 [265 P.2d 881]).
Much has been said by a majority of this court in earlier
eases about th~Jbharacter of the payments in a property
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settlement agreement being one of fact for the trial court
in a modification proceeding. However a majority has also
held proper the action of a trial court refusing the admission
of evidence on that point (Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36
[265 P.2d 873], and see my concurring and dissenting opinion
at pages 44, 45). In the Anderson case the trial court determined that the monthly payments were an integrated and
inseparable part of the property settlement agreement and
that the obligation for such payments did not terminate
on the death of the payor since no provision for termination
had been agreed to by the parties. A majority of this court
affirmed the judgment in that respect. Here the trial court
found that the remarriage of the wife and majority of the
children terminated the obligation for the monthly payments
even though no provision for termination was to be found in
the agreement entered into by the parties. A majority of
this court affirms the action of the trial court but not on the
theory that there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court on an issue of fact. The exact
theory on which the majority conclusion is based is not
stated_ It would appear from reading the opinion that the
opposite conclusion was to be reached since it is held that
the monthly payments were an integrated, inseparable part
of the property settlement agreement which contained no
provision for termination on remarriage of the wife or death
of the payor. It appears to me that the conclusion is inescapable that neither Anderson v. Mart nor Messenger v.
Messenger is in "accord" with the holding here as the majority assures us they are, but that they are directly contra
to both the reasoning and conclusion of the majority here.
The majority seems to have seceded from its position that
the character of the payments in a property settlement agreemimt is a question of fact for the trier of fact. It is apparent
from the majority holdings in the recent cases of Dexter v.
Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36 [265 P.2d 873], Fox v. Fox, 42 Ca1.2d
49 [265 P.2d 881], Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Ca1.2d 55 [265 P.2d
865], Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Ca1.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988],
Anderson v. Mart, 47 Ca1.2d 274 [303 P.2d 539], and the
case at bar that the character of the payments for support
and maintenance in a property settlement agreement is a
question for thia court to determine as it sees fit without
reference to either the determination of the trial court or other
standard based upon logic or precedent. Until such .;time
as a majority of ~,eourt sees fit to clarify its position with
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to the contractual rights of the parties and announces
Mtllndard based upon sound precedent, the statement in my
c()neurring and dissenting opinion in the Flynn case that the
Ihw in this field constitutes an effective trap designed to catch
b()th wary and unwary attorneys who are trying honestly and
Nmllcientiously to protect their clients' interests is more
applicable now than it was then. The untold confusion
exillting in the law in this field as the result of the conflicting
rlllciFlions of this court is also a trap for trial and appellate
jllr]~es who are honestly endeavoring to do their duty in deciding cases of this character. This court could, by employing
a lIIimple proces.'> of logic and reason, so clarify the law in these
C8Aes that lawyers and trial judges would know how to disp'Jlle of them properly and thus relieve this court of at least
a portion of its already tremendous work load.
J adhere to the views expressed in my concurring and disAenting opinions in the Fox, Dexter, Flynn, Messenger and
Anderson cases, and it is my considered opinion that if and
when the majority of this court adopts these views the conftlJllion which now exists in this field of law will be obviated
and the burden now cast upon the courts in disposing of these
e8llCFl will be greatly reduced.
There may be cases where, in the settlement of property
rigMs npon the dissolution of a marriage, that one sponse reeeives a larger share of the community property and agrees
to pay the other cash in lieu thereof. In such a case the
aw-eement should provide for the amount to be paid and the
time of payment. It is obvious that such payments should
not terminate upon the death of the payor or the remarriage
of the payee. But in cases such as this and Anderson v.
Mart, supra, where it appears that the payments are for suppo)"t and maintenance, and no provision is made for their
termination, they should, as a matter of law, terminate upon
t.he death of the payor or the remarriage of the payee.
The trial court determined here that the provision for
monthly payments wa'> intended by the parties as support and
maintenance for the wife and children and that snch paymcnts were intended to terminate upon the remarriage of the
wife and the attainment of majority by the children. A reading of the record disdoses ample evidence to sustain this
determination and it should, therefore, be affirmed.

It

SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concnr in
the judgment insoUrr as it affirms the order of the trial court.
The evidence U; this case, as I view it, supports &nd estab-
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lisbes legally tenable ground :for all essential findings and conclusions of the trial court arid for that reason I would affirm
its order in all respects. Also I would prefer that the majority
had expressly overruled rather than attempted to distinguish
Messenger v. Messenger (1956),46 Ca1.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988],
and Anderson v. Mart (1956), 47 Ca1.2d 274 [303 P.2d 539],
in tbe respects as to wbich each appears to assert and rely on
a doctrine inconsistent witb the bolding of the majority today.
Sbenk, J., concurred.

